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The  present  review  is based  on the  thesis  that  mate  choice  results  from  information-processing  mech-
anisms  governed  by  computational  rules  and  that,  to understand  how  females  choose  their  mates,  we
should  identify  which  are  the sources  of information  and  how  they  are  used  to make  decisions.  We
describe  mate  choice  as a three-step  computational  process  and  for  each  step  we present  theories  and
review empirical  evidence.  The  first step  is  a perceptual  process.  It describes  the  acquisition  of  evidence,
that is,  how  females  use  multiple  cues  and  signals  to  assign  an  attractiveness  value  to prospective  mates
(the  preference  function  hypothesis).  The  second  step  is  a  decisional  process.  It describes  the  construc-
tion  of  the  decision  variable  (DV),  which  integrates  evidence  (private  information  by  direct  assessment),
priors  (public  information),  and value  (perceived  utility)  of  prospective  mates  into  a  quantity  that  is  used
by a decision  rule  (DR)  to produce  a choice.  We  make  the  assumption  that  females  are  optimal  Bayesian
decision  makers  and we  derive  a formal  model  of  DV  that  can explain  the  effects  of preference  func-
tions,  mate  copying,  social  context,  and  females’  state  and  condition  on the  patterns  of mate  choice.  The
third step  of mating  decision  is a deliberative  process  that  depends  on  the  DRs.  We  identify  two  main
categories  of  DRs  (absolute  and  comparative  rules),  and  review  the  normative  models  of mate  sampling
tactics  associated  to  them.  We  highlight  the limits  of  the  normative  approach  and  present  a  class  of com-
putational  models  (sequential-sampling  models)  that  are  based  on the  assumption  that DVs  accumulate
noisy evidence  over  time  until  a decision  threshold  is  reached.  These  models  force  us to  rethink  the
dichotomy  between  comparative  and  absolute  decision  rules,  between  discrimination  and  recognition,
and  even  between  rational  and  irrational  choice.  Since  they  have  a  robust  biological  basis,  we  think  they
may  represent  a useful  theoretical  tool  for behavioural  ecologist  interested  in  integrating  proximate  and
ultimate  causes  of mate  choice.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.. Introduction
An adult female that is looking for a mate, having survived to
his stage, proves to have been a good decision maker. As a young,
he made appropriate decisions about when to move and when to
est, where to go and where to avoid, and what and how to eat. But
he positive fitness effects of these previous decisions could be sud-
enly nullified, if she now chooses the wrong mate. Indeed, mate
hoice is one of the most important decisions that females make
n their life. For this reason, females are expected to have evolved
 cognitive machinery that make them able to choose their matesPlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
ffectively, by avoiding heterospecifics and by favouring discrim-
nation between conspecifics of different qualities (Ryan, 1997;
yan and Rand, 1993). Females usually base their mating decisions
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 11 6704547.
E-mail address: sergio.castellano@unito.it (S. Castellano).
376-6357/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.
oi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010on several males’ signals or cues, which they perceive in either the
same or different sensory modalities (Candolin, 2003; Partan and
Marler, 1999). Since the information they acquire from these traits
is always noisy and often conflicting, mating decisions are intrinsi-
cally uncertain and prone to errors (Johnstone and Grafen, 1992).
To understand how mate choice evolved, we should thus under-
stand how the uncertainty problem in mating decision has been
solved.
Uncertainty in mating decisions depends on two factors. First, it
depends on the amount of the information acquired. Normative
models of mate choice typically focus on this aspect and try to
find optimal economical rules of information gathering (Luttbeg,
1996, 2002; Real, 1990; Sullivan, 1994). But uncertainty depends
also on the cognitive mechanisms of information processing, thatate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
is, on how several sources of information are integrated and used
to reach a decision. Until recently, the cognitive aspects of mating
decision have received scarce attention in sexual selection the-
ory, because it was simplistically assumed that, if mate choice is
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dvantageous to females, then selection will provide them with
he way for choosing mates accurately. Bateson and Healy (2005),
astellano (2009a), Ryan et al. (2007, 2009) contended this view
mphasizing the role of cognitive mechanisms for understanding
he evolution of mate choice. Following the theoretical approach
roposed by Marr (1982),  Castellano (2009a) argued that sexual
election theory needs a computational theory of mate choice, a
heory that could explain mating decisions at both the abstract
evel of the computational properties and at the proximate level of
lgorithm implementation. In the present paper, we  move further
long this path of inquiry, by presenting a computational model of
ate choice and by reviewing empirical evidence in the light of this
odel.
Marr (1982) argued that the most general and abstract the-
ry of an information-processing system (i.e. its computational
heory) responds to the question of “what is being computed”
nd “why the computation is carried out”. In mate choice, com-
utation involves the perceived qualities (i.e. attractiveness) of
rospective mates and it is carried out to select an appropriate
ale, given the amount of available uncertain evidence. Statisti-
al theory predicts that an optimal decision process that wants
o estimate the probability of an uncertain event must adopt a
ayesian approach. We  thus make the adaptationist assumption
hat selection should have promoted the evolution of a Bayesian
odel of mating decision, that is, we assume that the computa-
ional theory of mate choice is based on the Bayesian computation
f the posterior probability that a male is an appropriate mate
see Section 2).
Bayes’ theorem has been often used by theoreticians in mod-
ling animal behaviour (review in McNamara et al., 2006) and,
n particular, mate choice (Collins et al., 2006; Lange and Dukas,
009; Uehara et al., 2005) and there is empirical evidence that ani-
als behave in a way consistent with the predictions of Bayesian
pdating models (Biernaskie et al., 2009; Mabry and Stamps, 2008;
alone, 2006). A Bayesian cognitive machinery of mating decisionPlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
mplies that female nervous system represents information about
rospective mates in terms of conditional probability density func-
ions. Recent studies in neuroscience provide evidence consistent
ith the hypothesis that perceptual computations in humans or
ig. 1. A schematic representation of a Bayesian decision variable. A female treefrog is li
he  male, whose call she perceives at an attractiveness level A, is an appropriate mate (P(H
epend on what she already knows about that male (prior probability, P(H)) and on the lik
P(A|H)) or inappropriate (P(A|Hc) mates. We  call U the ratio between these two  likelihoods
.  Bayes’ rule explains how prior probabilities and likelihoods could be used to derive the PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx
non-human primates use these types of internal representations
(Knill and Pouget, 2004) and that decisions arise by integrating
information over time according to a Bayesian updating mechanism
(Körding, 2007; Yang and Shadlen, 2007). It is not clear, however,
to what extent these findings may  be generalized to other animals
with much simple nervous systems. In these species, females may
rely on rules that are simpler and less computational demanding
than Bayesian computations, but that result in decisions similar to
those predicted by Bayesian updating strategies (Lange and Dukas,
2009).
In this paper we review patterns of mate choice and try to
explain them in terms of their underlying mechanisms of infor-
mation processing. We  know a lot about mate choice. We know
that mating decisions depend on mating preferences (Section 3)
and that females make decisions on the basis of both private
and public information (Section 4). We  know that experience can
affect mating decisions and that mate choice is often a highly
plastic behaviour, which may  be influenced by both the inter-
nal state and the external conditions in which choice is made
(Section 4). We  know that females may  use different tactics for
sampling and evaluating prospective mates and that choosing is
often time consuming and accurate decisions require long evalua-
tion sessions (Sections 5 and 6). We  review all these phenomena
within the unitary theoretical framework of the Bayesian model of
mating decision. Although the entire theoretical building is based
on the adaptationist assumption of optimal mate choice, we  will
not deal with optimality nor we will review theories and empir-
ical evidence on the adaptive significance of mate choice. Our
focus will be on the information-processing mechanisms of mate
choice.
2. The model of Bayesian decision makingate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
son of posterior probabilities that certain events occur. Imagine a
female that is evaluating a prospective mate to decide whether
he is or is not an appropriate mate (Fig. 1, and see Glossary in
Box 1 ).
stening to the advertisement call of a prospective mate. She must decide whether
|A)). Since the female has only partial and uncertain information, optimal decisions
elihoods that a male of attractiveness A belongs to the sample of either appropriate
, because it represents the perceived utility (value) of a male, given his attractiveness
 posterior probability that this male is an appropriate mate (P(H|A)).
ARTICLE ING ModelBEPROC-2453; No. of Pages 17
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Box 1: Glossary
Appropriateness (of a prospective mate) is the value of the
decision variable. It is the posterior probability of consider-
ing a male an appropriate mate and depends on his perceived
attractiveness,  on his prior probability and on the internal and
external conditions of the decision maker,  which influence the
perceived utility of the prospective mate.
Attractiveness (of a prospective mate) is defined by the pref-
erence function and depends only on perception. It represents
a source of private information that is used by the decision
variable during the evaluation process.
Choosiness is a component of mating preference, which does
not depend on the private (i.e. the preference function) or pub-
lic information (priors) on the prospective mate, but on the
perceived utility of that male. Variation in choosiness is due
to a variation in the utility function, which may  result from a
change of either the internal or the external conditions of the
decision makers.
Decision rule determines how and when the decision variable
is interpreted to arrive to a commitment to a particular choice.
Decision variable is the synonym of appropriateness. It is the
object responsible for the intragration of multiple piece of evi-
dence over time.
Preference function defines the perceived attractiveness of a
prospective mate on the basis of the signals and cues received
by the decision maker.
Sequential sampling describes the dynamic of the decisional
process, that is, the accommodation of multiple pieces of evi-
dence over time. It includes two components: the decision
variable, which integrates evidence over time, and the deci-
sion rule, which establishes when it is time to stop the process
and to commit.
Utility function describes the relationship between the per-
ceived attractiveness and the perceived utility of a prospective
mate.
Utility is the level of uncertainty associated to the perceived
attractiveness of a prospective mate and it is defined as the
ratio between the conditional probability (likelihood) that the
male is attractive given he is and given he is not an appro-
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mpriate mate (U = P(A|H)/P(A|H )). The utility is assumed to be a
monotonic function of the perceived attractiveness.
Decision depends on the amount of evidence (A) supporting the
ypothesis (H) that the prospective mate is an appropriate mate.
uppose that evidence depends on a set of male’s traits (x) so that,
fter evaluation, the amount of evidence the female has acquired is
 = a(x) + ε (1)
here a(x) represents the deterministic component of perception
escribing how the female integrates different sources of infor-
ation encoded in x, whereas ε is the stochastic component of
erception, a normally distributed random variable with zero mean
nd variance 2 (Castellano, 2010; Phelps et al., 2006). Since the
tochastic variable A is consistent with the definition of “preference
unction” proposed by Jennions and Petrie (1997, p. 286 “the order
n which an individual ranks prospective mates ceteris paribus”),
e name the male perceived attractiveness A as the female’s pref-
rence function (PF).
According to the Bayes theorem, the probability that a male is
n appropriate mate is given by the following formula:
(H|A) = P(A|H)
P(A)
× P(H) (2)
In words, the probability that H is true, given a perceived attrac-Please cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
iveness A, equals the probability that an appropriate mate is
erceived at level A (P(A|H)) (i.e. the likelihood of A in appropriate
ates), times the prior probability that that male is an appropriate
ate (P(H)), divided by the probability to perceive an advertising PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx 3
level A, independent of whether the male is or is not an appropriate
mate (P(A)). This latter probability, P(A), is the sum of the probabil-
ities of perceiving A when H is either true (P(A|H)) or false (P(A|Hc))
(where Hc correspond to a non appropriate male).
P (A) = P(A|H) × P(H) + P(A|Hc) × P(Hc) (3)
Imagine a female that has no previous information about the
quality of a prospective mate, which she perceives of attractiveness
A (i.e. her prior probability being P(H) = P(Hc) = 0.5). The probability
that she will perceive this male as an appropriate mate increases
with the increase of the ratio between the perceived probability of a
correct assignment (P(A|H)) and the perceived probability of a false
positive (P(A|H)c). For example, if P(A|H) = 0.9 is much greater than
P(A|H)c = 0.3 (their ratio being 3), then P(A) = 0.6 and P(H|A) = 0.72.
In contrast, as the probability of a false negative increases (i.e.
P(A|H)c = 0.6, the ratio being 1.5), P(A) increases as well (P(A) = 0.75)
and, consequently, the choice probability decreases (P(H|A) = 0.6).
This simple numerical example should make clear that the effec-
tiveness of a perceived signal A(x) depends on the perceived
probability that x is emitted by both an appropriate and an inap-
propriate mate. In this sense, the ratio U = P(A|H)/P(A|Hc) might be
viewed as the perceived utility of the male and it is directly related
to the perceived value of the information acquired (see Box 2 ).
Box 2: Utility and information
The utility function u(A) is a measure of how the preference
value A is actually related to the appropriateness of the mate.
In fact, when u(A) = 1 and the likelihood of A in an appropri-
ate mate is the same as its likelihood in a non-appropriate
mate, i.e., P(A|H) = P(A|Hc), then P(H|A) = P(H) and choice does
not involve preference. For instance, when nothing is known
about the male, P(H) = 1/2 and choice is random. On the other
hand, when u(A) = 0, then P(H|A) = 0 and the mate is refused
with probability 1.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the utility function is related
to the information content I(H,A) of the preference value A, that
measures how the assignment of a preference value reduces
the uncertainty of choice:
I(H, A) = E(H) − E(H|A),
where E(H) and E(H|A) are the entropy of H and the conditional
entropy of H given the preference A. Entropy is a measure of
the uncertainty of a random variable that varies between 0 (no
uncertainty) and 1 (maximum uncertainty): correspondingly,
the information varies between -1 and 1, and is negative when
the preference increases the uncertainty of choice: for instance,
I(H,A) = 0 when u(A) = 1, I(H,A) is minimal (and non positive)
when u(A) = P(Hc)/P(H).
The first condition means that when A is equally likely and
P(A|H) = P(A|Hc), preference does not entail any information
gain. On the other hand, the condition u(A) = P(Hc)/P(H) implies
that choice is random with P(H|A) = 1/2: in this case, preference
obviously increases the uncertainty in the selection process.
The perceived utility is the ratio between two conditional
probabilities. For species with relatively simple nervous systems,
however, such a calculation may  be too computationally demand-
ing to be carried out effectively. In these species, thus, selection may
have favoured the evolution of much cheaper ways of representingate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
the perceived utility of prospective mates. We,  thus, make a fur-
ther and important assumption. We assume that females directly
translate sensory information (the perceived attractiveness) into
likelihood ratio (i.e. the perceived utility), by means of a utility
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unction (UF), U = u(A), which increases monotonically with males’
erceived attractiveness. Eq. (2) may  be re-written as:
(H|A) = u(A)
(u(A) − 1) + 1P(H)
(4)
In the special case of no priors (i.e. P(H) = 0.5),
(H|A) = u(A)/(u(A) + 1). As we will appear clear in Section 4.2,
he distinction between preference and utility function is
mportant if we assume that the perceived utility (value) of
 prospective mate may  depend not only on his perceived
ttractiveness (the quality of the sensory information), but also
n the internal state and the external conditions of choosing
emales.
Eq. (4) defines the posterior probability P(H|A). We  name this
lement the Decision Variable (DV). The DV combines both evi-
ence and priors into a quantity that is interpreted by a Decision
ule (DR) to produce a choice (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Accord-
ng to this model, mate choice might be viewed as a three-step
rocess: (1) the acquisition of evidence; (2) the evaluation of the
rospective mate according to acquired evidence and priors; (3) the
pplication of a Decision Rule to the Decision Variable. For each of
hese three steps, we review the theories that have been proposed
nd the empirical evidence that supports them.
. Acquisition of evidence: The computational mechanisms
f perceived male attractiveness
The preference function (Eq. (1))  describes how females convert
he information of a prospective mate in an internal representa-
ion of his attractiveness. Implicitly, our model of mating decision
ssumes the perceived attractiveness (A) to be a one-dimension
ariable, that is, it assumes females to order prospective mates
long an ordinal scale of values. However, the internal representa-
ion of mate attractiveness might not be one-dimensional. Female
ating decisions depend on several male traits, often involv-
ng different sensory modalities (reviews in Bro-Jorgensen, 2010;
andolin, 2003; Hebets and Papaj, 2005; Jennions and Petrie, 1997)
nd females may  integrate these different sources of information
n at least three different ways: (i) they may  form a one-dimension
epresentation of male attractiveness, as assumed by Eq. (1);  (ii)
hey may  form a multi-dimension representation of male attrac-
iveness, but use a single decision variable (Knill and Pouget, 2004);
r (iii) they may  integrate different sources of information into
ifferent DVs, hierarchically ordered according to a priority rule
Candolin, 2003). Now, we consider the simple case in which
emales possess a one-dimension preference function and use a
ingle DV in mating decision. In Section 7, we will return to this
ssue and we will consider the case of multi-dimension preference
unctions and the use of multiple DVs in mate choice.
.1. The preference function hypothesis
The concept of “preference function” was first introduced by
ande (1981) to describe sexual selection on male traits. He defined
 “preference function”, (y,z), as the probability that a female with
henotype y chooses a male of phenotype z. This definition, how-
ver, is more similar to our definition of decision variable (Eq. (2))
han to the Jennions and Petrie’s (1997) definition of preference
unction (see Eq. (1)). Indeed, in sexual selection studies, the con-
epts of choice and preference have been often used as synonyms
Wagner, 1998), probably because the only way to empiricallyPlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
escribe mating preferences is by observing mating decisions. Nev-
rtheless, Wagner (1998) emphasizes the importance of keeping
hese two concepts distinct, because choice depends not only on
ating preferences, but also on female sampling behaviour (i.e. PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx
‘choosiness’ sensu Jennions and Petrie, 1997) and on the environ-
mental conditions in which choice is carried out (Wagner, 1998).
The Bayesian model of mate choice makes a clear distinction
between preferences and choice and it also helps us to under-
stand which are the assumptions that make it possible to derive
patterns of preferences from observed patterns of choice. In fact,
imagine a typical mate-choice experiment (i.e. recognition test, see
below), in which we measure the conditional probability C(H|x)
that a stimulus H of quality x elicits a positive taxis in a receptive
female. If females have no priors (i.e. P(H) = 0.5) and if the probabil-
ity of responding to a stimulus is the probability of perceiving it as
appropriate (i.e. C(H|x) = P(H|x)), then, from Eq. (4),  the perceived
utility u(A(x)) (but notice, not the perceived attractiveness A(x))
is u(A(x)) = C(H|x)/(1 − C(H|x)). If the monotonic function between
utility and attractiveness does not change both between and within
females during the experiment, then the ranks of prospective mates
along the preference and utility functions are the same.
The empirical study of mating preferences uses two  experimen-
tal paradigms: the recognition test and the comparative choice
(review in Wagner, 1998). In a recognition test, females are exposed
to one stimulus at a time (no-choice experiment), whereas in a
comparative test they are simultaneously exposed to two or more
stimuli. In both tests, preferences are measured by observing the
frequency or latency of behavioural responses, such as positive
taxis (e.g. the relative number of females that approach a stim-
ulus in phonotaxis experiments, Gerhardt, 1995), the speed and
direction on a walking compensator or of tethered movements
(i.e phonotaxis in insects, Doherty, 1985),association time (i.e. the
proportion of time spent in proximity to a visual stimulus in fish,
Cummings and Mollaghan, 2006; Walling et al., 2010, and birds Hoi
and Griggio, 2011; or to a chemical stimulus in mammals, Clutton-
Brock and McAuliffe, 2009), or the number of signals elicited (i.e.
contact calls in birds, Moravec et al., 2006). Both recognition and
comparative tests have several practical limitations, mainly due to
the low accuracy and precision with which preferences are mea-
sured. While the low accuracy constrains the ability to describe
variation in mating preferences and may  limit our understand-
ing of the selective forces acting on female mating decisions, the
low precision of these tests is a somewhat more serious problem,
because of the systematic errors it may  introduce. Since there is
no reasons to assume that choice probability in recognition tests
is a linear function of preferences, these tests may  describe the
ranks, but not the quantitative differences in preference strength
between items. Furthermore, dichotomous choice tests do not con-
trol for differences in female sampling tactics and, thus, they may
confound repeated sampling of prospective mates as evidence for
weak preferences (Bush et al., 2002).
In most cases, recognition and the comparative choice tests
have been used to investigate how females respond to variation in
single components of male signals. The interaction between mat-
ing preferences and male trait distribution determines the type
of biological information received by females (Gerhardt, 1992):
a monotonic function (or an unimodal function with peak either
higher or lower than the mean) suggests that the trait is impor-
tant for mate-quality assessment, whereas an unimodal preference
function with peak close to the population mean is usually seen as
evidence that the trait is important for species recognition because
traits on both distribution tails are perceived as less attractive than
those close to the mean. An unimodal preference function, how-
ever, may  also arise as the effect of homotypic preferences, which
make females more likely to mate with males of similar pheno-
types, as it has been described in monogamous birds (Ludwig andate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
Becker, 2008). In this case, the unimodal distribution of preferences
reflects an unimodal distribution of phenotypes in the two  sexes.
In many insects and anurans, females choose their mates on the
basis of their advertisement calls (review in Gerhardt and Huber,
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002). For example, Gerhardt (1991) shows that in grey treefrogs
Hyla chrysoscelis and H. versicolor) female preferences are stabiliz-
ng on some fine-scale temporal acoustic properties (pulse rate, call
uration, rise time) and directional on some gross-scale temporal
roperties (call duration, call rate), suggesting that females acquire
rom the former information important for species recognition and
rom the latter information important for intra-specific discrimina-
ion (mate-quality assessment). This study has been replicated on
any other anuran and insect species, confirming that one of the
ajor advantages of acoustic communication is the potential for
ncoding multiple messages into a single signal (review in Gerhardt
nd Huber, 2002; Ryan, 2001).
Multiple messages in mating signals pose the question of how
emales process different sources of information. Since different
ues or signals may  provide females with conflicting information,
t has become clear that the problem of assigning a preference
alue to prospective mates critically depends on how these cues
nteract with each other (Hebets and Papaj, 2005). From a the-
retical point of view, females can integrate different sources of
nformation into a one-dimension preference function by follow-
ng two computational rules: an additive integration (Burke and
urphy, 2007; Kunzler and Bakker, 2001; Schul and Bush, 2002),
hen they make a weighted sum of the perceived attractiveness of
ach component, or a multiplicative interaction (Castellano, 2010;
astellano and Rosso, 2007; Schul and Bush, 2002), when compo-
ents have a synergic effect on the overall perceived attractiveness.
s observed by Schnupp and King (2001),  when females weigh the
omponents of a signal, they perform an operation analog to the
ogical “OR”, because just a single highly attractive component may
ake the entire signal attractive. In contrast, when females multi-
ly the perceived attractiveness of each component, they perform
n operation analog to the logical “AND”, because it suffices a sin-
le poorly attractive component to make the entire signal poorly
ttractive. Because of these computational differences, additive and
ultiplicative integration may  solve different functional roles in
ate choice. If components convey highly redundant information,
hen summation is expected to perform better than multiplication.
n contrast, if they convey different sources of information, then
ultiplication is expected to do better. Castellano and Rosso (2007)
nd Castellano (2010) investigated female mating preferences for
ultiple-attribute signals in the Italian treefrog, Hyla intermedia.
hese studies supported the one-dimension preference-function
ypothesis and provided evidence that acoustic properties impor-
ant for species recognition and mate quality assessment interact
ultiplicatively with each other in determining overall signal
ttractiveness.
Brooks et al. (2005) described the shape of the preference
unction for multi-attribute mating signals in the cricket Teleogryl-
us commodus using multiple-regressions techniques. They tested
emale preferences on a set of 300 artificial calls, opportunely
onstructed to show simultaneous and uncorrelated variation in
ve acoustical traits. Then, they used non-linear regression mod-
ls (with linear, quadratic and cross-product terms) to describe
he female preference function over this set of calls and showed
 dominant component of stabilizing multivariate preferences act-
ng on the cricket call (Bentsen et al., 2006). A similar approach
as used by Wagner and Basolo (2007) and by Gerhardt and
rooks (2009) to study multivariate preference functions on mating
alls, respectively, in a cricket (Gryllus lineaticeps)  and in a treefrog
Hyla versicolor).  Wagner and Basolo (2007) considered only two
coustic traits that were known to convey different biological
nformation and found that only one of them had statistically sig-Please cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
ificant effects on the multivariate preference function. Gerhardt
nd Brooks (2009),  in contrast, considered five acoustic traits and
howed that the multivariate female preference function was sig-
ificantly influenced by linear, quadratic, and cross-product terms. PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx 5
3.2. Variation in preference function
Preference functions play a central role in the evolution of male
secondary sexual traits (Andersson, 1994) and among-population
variation in preference function may  promote pre-zygotic isolation
and, thus, speciation (review in Kirkpatrick and Ravigne, 2002).
For these reasons, variation in preference functions has received
great attention from evolutionary biologists (Brooks and Endler,
2001; Jennions and Petrie, 1997; Schielzeth et al., 2010; Widemo
and Saether, 1999). Since our focus is on the processes of mate
choice, we  will not review this abundant literature, but we briefly
consider the role of experience on preference functions. Widemo
and Saether (1999) identified two components of preference func-
tions: a fixed ‘innate predisposition’ to respond to certain stimuli
and a ‘flexible reference template’. Whether the former can be
explained as the heritable components of neuro-sensory organs
and might be immune to experience, the latter explains prefer-
ences that arise by comparing prospective mates against internal
standards often acquired by experience. For example, in many birds
(review by Riebel, 2003, 2009) and some spiders (Hebets, 2003),
female preferences are influenced by early experience, whereas
in several rodents they are affected by male familiarity: in some
species familiar males are preferred over unfamiliar males (e.g.
Harvest mice, Mycromys minutes, Brandt and Macdonald, 2011),
in others species the opposite pattern is observed (e.g. mandarin
voles, Microtus mandarinus, Tai et al., 2000).
In all these examples, experience causes variation in preference
functions and, thus, in mating preferences. Variation in mating pref-
erences, however, may  arise also by a change in utility functions.
In these cases, experience has no effect on the perceived attrac-
tiveness, but only on its perceived utility. As we shall see in the
next section, utility functions are an important component of the
decision variables, they may  affect choosiness and, thus, they may
play a central role in explaining short term plasticity in mating
preferences (see Section 4.2).
4. The decision variable
The perceived attractiveness of prospective mates is one of the
sources of information for mating decision. Our  model assumes
that females use the perceived attractiveness of males to infer their
value (utility), which we express as the ratio between the two like-
lihoods P(A|H)) and P(A|Hc). By combining this piece of information
with what she already knows about a male (i.e. P(H)), a female can
compute the posterior probability that the male is an appropriate
mate. But, to estimate this quantity, should she rely only on her
own perception of males’ attractiveness (i.e. private information),
or should she rely also on other sources of information, which she
may  acquire, for example, by observing how males interact with
each other and with other females in the population (public infor-
mation)? Recent studies have provided evidence for the role of the
social context in influencing female mating decision. We  review
these studies in the light of our model of Bayesian mate choice.
4.1. The role of public information and social eavesdropping in
mating decisions: P(H)
Social eavesdropping (McGregor, 2005) is the act of obtaining
public information from signaling interactions between con-
specifics (Valone, 1989; Valone and Templeton, 2002). It is thought
to occur when an individual changes his behaviour towards a con-
specific, after observing the latter in a social interaction (Bonnieate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
and Earley, 2007). Social eavesdropping has been mainly stud-
ied in two  behavioural contexts: agonistic territorial interactions
(Magnhagen, 2006; Naguib and Todt, 1997) and mate choice
(review in Dugatkin, 1996; Westneat et al., 2000; Witte, 2006).
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In mate choice, the use of public information has been observed
ainly in fish and birds (review Galef, 2006; Valone, 2007;
estneat et al., 2000) and it appears to be more common in
emales than in males (but see Plath et al., 2009; Schlupp and Ryan,
997; Widemo, 2006, for exceptions). Females can acquire pub-
ic information on a prospective mate in two distinct ways. They
ay  observe prospective mates in intra-sexual aggressive contests
Doutrelant and McGregor, 2000; Otter et al., 1999). For example, in
emale black-capped chickadees, Poecile atricapillus,  the probabil-
ty of extra-pair copulations depends on the outcome of male–male
ocal contests. By experimentally manipulating the outcome of
ontests between the female’s social partner and either an aggres-
ive or submissive simulated opponent, Mennill et al. (2002, 2003)
howed that females paired with high-ranking males were more
ikely to accept extra-pair sires when their partner had been
xposed to aggressive rather than to submissive opponents. Inter-
stingly, Ophir and Galef (2004) showed that, in Japanese quails,
he use of public information depends on females’ previous sexual
xperience: when observing an antagonistic interaction between
wo males, young virgin females preferred the most aggressive
ale, whereas the sexual experienced females preferred the least
ggressive male. In this species, experience may  alter the effect
f public information, but not the aptitude for using it in mating
ecision.
A second mechanism to acquire social information on prospec-
ive mates is by observing them in inter-sexual courtship
nteractions. This mechanism of non-independent mate choice has
een dubbed ‘mate-copying’, because it assumes that females, first,
cquire information on prospective mates by observing sexual
nteractions between nearby males and females and, then, use this
nformation to choose among those males (review in Dugatkin,
996; Galef and White, 2000). Operatively, evidence for mate copy-
ng is given by showing that the probability that a ‘focal’ female
hooses a certain male either increases or decreases depending on
hether she has previously observed another (‘model’) female to
hoose or to reject that male (Witte and Ueding, 2003). Originally
escribed in lekking birds and shoaling fish (review in Dugatkin,
996; Witte, 2006), mate copying has been further observed in
ther vertebrate and invertebrate taxa (insects, Mery et al., 2009;
ammals, Galef et al., 2008; humans, Little et al., 2008), suggesting
hat the role it plays in mating decision might depend more on the
cological constraints that limit the access to this source of pub-
ic information rather than on cognitive constraints that prevent
emales to use it.
According to our model, public information influences the prior
robability (P(H)), but it has no effects on either the attractiveness
A) or the utility (U(A)) of prospective mates. A similar hypothesis
as first presented in a verbal model by Nordell and Valone (1998)
nd, successively, formalized in a mathematical model of optimal
ayesian decision making by Uehara et al. (2005).  According to this
iew, mate-choice copying and, more generally, the use of public
nformation in mating decision does not represent an alternative,
ut rather a complementary strategy to the use of private infor-
ation (Sirot, 2001). Two  lines of empirical evidence support this
iew (Valone, 2007). First, the influence of public information on
ating decisions increases with the decreasing quality of private
nformation. Indeed, in a two-choice test, a female is more likely
o adopt a mate-choice copying strategy when the males are simi-
ar to each other (Dugatkin, 1996; Dugatkin and Godin, 1992) than
hen they differ markedly (Brooks, 1996). Second, the role of public
nformation decreases with increasing mating experience. In gup-
ies, young females are more likely to copy older females than vicePlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
ersa (Dugatkin and Godin, 1993) and when young females are
llowed to observe both a young and an older model female, they
re more likely to copy the latter than the former (Amlacher and
ugatkin, 2005). According to Valone (2007),  old and experienced PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx
females rely more on their private information than younger
females.
Although several studies show results consistent with the
hypothesis that the effects of public information are on the male
involved in the observed social interaction, there is also evidence
for the alternative hypothesis that females can generalize the
acquired public information to modify their mating preferences.
White and Galef (2000) show that, in Japanese quails, females that
have previously observed a conspecific male mating, may  succes-
sively show a preference not only for that specific male, but also
for males that share his characteristics. Similar results have been
observed in zebra finches (Swaddle et al., 2005) and guppies (Godin
et al., 2005) and also in an invertebrate, Drosophila melanogaster
(Mery et al., 2009). According to this hypothesis female mate-
choice copying is a form of cultural transmission (Kirkpatrick and
Dugatkin, 1994), because mate preferences evolve through mech-
anisms of social learning.
We have emphasized the role of public information on the pri-
ors of a Bayesian decision variable. However, females may construct
priors also from previously acquired private information. For exam-
ple, female satin bowerbirds, Ptilonorhynchus violaceus, are known
to choose mates using mating experience of previous years (Uy
et al., 2000) and, on a much shorter time scale, female field crickets,
Teleogryllus oceanicus, are known to use information acquired by
assessing long-range calls of a prospective mate when they eval-
uate the attractiveness of his short-range courtship songs (Rebar
et al., 2009).
4.2. The perceived utility of prospective mates: U = P(A|H)/P(A|Hc)
To calculate the posterior probability P(H|A), females must know
how to use the male’s perceived attractiveness to estimate the two
conditional probabilities P(A|H) and P(A|Hc), the likelihood of per-
ceiving a male at an attractiveness level A, respectively, when he
is and when he is not an appropriate mate. Our model (see Eq. (4))
assumes that females have encoded in their genes and wired in
their nervous system this simple rule: the ratio P(A|H)/P(A|Hc) is
a monotonic increasing function of the male perceived attractive-
ness. We  called this relationship utility function (UF). In Fig. 2, we
assume that the UF is linear, that is, we  assume that the perceived
value of a prospective mate depends on A (the preference function,
PF) and on the two parameters that define the line: its slope and
intercept.
If the slope and the intercept are fixed, then A univocally deter-
mines U and the decision variable, DV. In this case, PF and UF  are
virtually indistinguishable. In contrast, when females can adjust
the UF parameters in relation to their experience, internal state, or
external conditions, then the effect of the PF on the DV may  change
and PF and UF are to be distinguished. Suppose a female is evaluat-
ing two  prospective mates (e.g. M1 and M2 in Fig. 2). An increase in
the slope of the UF would increase the difference in the perceived
values of the two males and, thus, it would increase the female’s dis-
crimination ability (see also Bailey, 2008). In contrast, an increase in
the intercept would increase the perceived values of the two males
of a constant amount, causing an increase in permissiveness and a
decrease in “choosiness” (Jennions and Petrie, 1997). Indeed, when
the perceived values of males increase, females are more likely to
accept them independent of their perceived attractiveness. Varia-
tion in “choosiness” has been usually seen as the effect of a change
of the decision rule (e.g. variation in the searching tactic or in the
acceptance threshold). Our model suggests that this variation may
arise also by a change in the DV.ate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
Plasticity in mating decisions is a widespread and well stud-
ied phenomenon (review in Jennions and Petrie, 1997; Widemo
and Saether, 1999). Mate choice occurs only during the breed-
ing season. Thus, mating decisions depend on female reproductive
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Fig. 2. The Utility Functions (UFs) define the relationship between the perceived attractiveness and the perceived utility of prospective mates. In this example, we assume
that  UFs are linear functions of attractiveness. The bottom panels of (A) and (B) show the frequency distribution of male attractiveness in the population. In (A) we compare
two  females (F1 and F2), whose UFs differ in intercept. Their ability to discriminate between the two males, M1 and M2,  is similar because the difference in their perceived
u a higher utility to all males, independent of their attractiveness. In (B), the two females
d ause their mean perceived utility of males in the population is the same. However, they
d erceived utility of M1 and M2 is larger in F1 than in F3.
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Fig. 3. The plastic Utility-Function hypothesis. We present an hypothesis of how a
female could adjust her decision variable to the local distribution of perceived male
attractiveness, by changing the intercept of her utility function. The three lines in
the top panel represent the utility functions (UF) of the same female when she hastilities is the same. However, F1 is more permissive than F2, because she assigns 
iffer  in both the slope and the intercept. They do not differ in permissiveness, bec
o  differ in the ability to discriminate between mates. In fact, the difference in the p
tage (Forsgren, 1997; Gabor and Halliday, 1997; Lynch et al., 2005;
varnstrom et al., 2000). For example, a study on plasticity in mat-
ng preference in Túngara frog females (Lynch et al., 2005) has
hown that the probability of recognizing both a conspecific call
receptivity) and a call less attractive than a conspecific call (per-
issiveness) changes during the reproductive stages of females,
robably because of differences in their hormonal state (Lynch et al.,
006). Receptivity and permissiveness are higher in the amplexed
han in the pre- and post-amplexed stages, but the probability of
iscriminating between two conspecific calls of different attrac-
iveness does not change. These results suggest that hormones
ffect the intercept, but probably not the slope of the UF.
Plasticity in mating decisions has been found to be related not
nly to female reproductive stage, but also to female condition
Burley and Foster, 2006; Eraly et al., 2009; Fisher and Rosenthal,
006; Fawcett and Johnstone, 2003a; Moskalik and Uetz, 2011;
oulin, 1994; Slagsvold et al., 1988), to age (Bateman et al., 2001;
odric-Brown and Nicoletto, 2001; Moore and Moore, 2001), and
o ecological (Booksmythe et al., 2008; Chaine and Lyon, 2008;
orsgren, 1992; Godin and Briggs, 1996; Gong and Gibson, 1996;
ilner et al., 2010) and social conditions (Bailey and Zuk, 2008,
009; Collins, 1995; Hebets, 2003; Izzo and Gray, 2011; Lehmann,
007; Rebar et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2001). In particular, strong
vidence for an effect of social experience on mating preferences
as been provided by studies on the cricket Teleogryllus oceani-
us. In this species, pre-copulatory mate choice is influenced by
xperience of male calling song: females are less responsive if they
ave been previously exposed to male calling (Bailey and Zuk, 2008,
009). Furthermore, females that have experienced a poorly attrac-
ive male are subsequently more likely to choose a male and to
etain his spermatophore for longer than females that have expe-
ienced a highly attractive male (Rebar et al., 2011). This patternPlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational mate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
ight be explained by assuming that females adjust the intercept
f the UF to the local distribution of male attractiveness (see Fig. 3),
ncreasing choosiness as the perceived mean attractiveness level
ncreases.
been exposed to three different distributions of male attractiveness (P1, P2, and
P3 – bottom panel). The model assumes that the female adjusts her UF so that the
same utility score is associated to the perceived mean attractiveness of males. As a
consequence, the perceived utility of a focal male is not constant, but it depends on
the female’s previous experience.
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As mentioned above, however, variation in female choosiness
ay  be due to a variation in the decision rule (DR) rather than
n the decision variable (DV). Indeed, this pattern has been usu-
lly explained as evidence for a flexible threshold in decision rules
Wagner et al., 2001). Since the two hypotheses are not necessarily
lternative to each other, it may  not be easy to devise an empirical
xperiment able to contrast them. In the next section, we deal with
ecision rules.
. The decision rules
Whether a DV is continuous, choice is a discrete categorical
ariable (females must choose either one of the alternatives). The
ecision rule (DR) is the function that converts the continuous DV
nto the discrete choice (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Two  types of
Rs can be identified: the absolute and the comparative DRs. An
bsolute DR is obtained by setting a threshold, when a DV is above
he threshold then the decision maker commits to the hypothesis
ssociated with that DV. In contrast, a comparative DR, typically,
xamines several alternative hypotheses and commits to the one
upported by the most robust evidence. For example, in statistics, a
raditional null-hypothesis test adopts an absolute decision rule. In
his case, the statistics represents the DVs and the critical value of
he statistics associated to the desired Type I error represents the
hreshold. In contrast, the model selection approach in statistics
ight be viewed as an example of comparative decision rule.
.1. Theoretical background
Although mate choice arises by applying a decision rule to
 pattern of preferences, these two components of mate choice
ave been rarely analysed within a unitary theoretical framework
Gibson and Langen, 1996). Typically, studies that focus on mat-
ng preferences (i.e. on the decision variable) aim at understanding
he relationship between signal variation and mating success, and
dopt a ‘descriptive’ approach. In contrast, studies that focus on
ating decision rules aim at understanding how females gather
nd use information on prospective mates for optimal mating deci-
ion and, thus, they adopt a ‘normative’ approach (Castellano and
ermelli, 2011).
Since the pioneering theoretical studies of Janetos (1980) and
arker (1978, 1983),  normative models of mate choice have been
eveloped in an optimality rather than in a game theoretic frame-
ork, in that they assume there is a single choosy sex, whose
ehaviour does not affect the advertising strategy of the other
ex (but see Fawcett and Johnstone, 2003a; Gualla et al., 2008;
ohnstone, 1996). These models try to explain mating decision
ules on the basis of how information is collected, that is, on the
asis of how females sample prospective mates. These models
ave identified three main sampling tactics: (i) random choice;
ii) sequential searching (SS models) and (iii) fixed-sample-search
actics (FS models, also known as best-of-n models).
The random choice model assumes simply that females mate
ith the first conspecific male they encounter and, thus, it repre-
ents a sort of ‘null-model’ against which to compare the others.
n SS models, females are assumed to use an absolute DR, in that
hey do not keep memory of previously assessed males and sam-
le prospective mates until they find a male with quality equal
o or greater than a certain threshold. In the FS models, females
re assumed to use a comparative rule, they sample a fix number
f prospective mates, keep memory of them, and choose the bestPlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
mong them (Real, 1990). An interesting variant of the FS model
as been proposed by Luttbeg (1996) and named the “comparative
ayesian” model (CB). Like in the FS model, females are assumed
o choose the best among a sample of males, but the sample size PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx
is not fixed and females are allowed to improve mate evaluation
by repeatedly assessing prospective mates according to a Bayesian
updating procedure (see below).
Under the adaptationist assumption that natural selection has
favoured the evolution of optimal mate sampling tactics, theoreti-
cians have compared the performance of these normative models
of mate choice to find out which is expected to fare better. Opti-
mal  decision rules, however, largely depends on the assumptions
on which these models are based.
A first critical assumption is about searching costs. Janetos
(1980) assigns no costs on mate searching and, thus, concludes
that FS models perform better than SS models. Real (1990) shows,
however, that if costs are introduced in the model, the FS decision
rule is outperformed by a SS model in which females adopt a fix-
threshold decision rule (Wiegmann et al., 2010b).  This rule, in fact,
allows females that encounter a high-quality male at the beginning
of their search to avoid the costs of further search.
A second critical assumption is about the role of uncertainty in
the decision process. Two types of uncertainty may  be identified:
uncertainty about the distribution of mate quality in the popula-
tion and uncertainty about the quality of a prospective mate. The
uncertainty on the local quality distribution has a relevant effect
on mate-search tactics. Real’s (1990) model assumes females to
know the local distribution of male qualities, which is uniform or
truncated normal. However, when the distribution of male qual-
ity is allowed to vary both spatially and temporally, the SS model
with fixed-threshold is no longer the optimal mate sampling tac-
tic (Mazalov et al., 1996; Luttbeg, 2002) and it is outperformed by
adaptive SS models, in which females learn from previous expe-
rience and update their acceptance threshold accordingly (Collins
et al., 2006; Dombrovsky and Perrin, 1994; Mazalov et al., 1996).
Collins et al. (2006) present a Bayesian model for updating informa-
tion in a social environment where the mate-quality distribution
is expected to vary in both the mean and the dispersion around
the mean. In this model, females assess male quality without error.
Under these conditions, the optimal rule is learning: females choose
their mates on the basis of an acceptance threshold defined by the
sum between the current estimate of the population mean and an
additive component that decreases with the increasing number of
sampled males.
The effect of the second type of uncertainty (uncertainty in
mate-quality assessment) has been investigated by Wiegmann and
Angeloni (2007).  In their model, females are assumed to be able to
assess only a subset of a male’s fitness-related attributes so that
the expected benefits for a female are no longer deterministic, but
stochastic. They find that stochasticity does not affect the qual-
itative behaviour of both the FS and the SS models. Given that
the expected benefits of choice continue to increase monotonically
with the observed male attributes, the SS model always fare better
than the FS model (see also Wiegmann et al., 2010a).
In Wiegmann and Angeloni (2007),  females are assumed to have
no control over the level of uncertainty in their evaluation. In con-
trast, the comparative Bayesian model of mate choice (Luttbeg,
1996), gives females control over their assessment accuracy. In
Luttbeg’s model, females have an uncertain prior estimate of the
quality of each prospective mate, and, at any step of the deci-
sion process, they could decide either to use this information (and
choose) or to continue the evaluation by improving assessment
accuracy. Females stop evaluating males and choose the best alter-
native when the cost of more information exceeds the expected
benefits of that information (Luttbeg, 1996).
Other two  assumptions that affect the relative performance ofate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
mate decision rules are the constraints on both the number of avail-
able alternatives and the maximum spendable time for making
decision. All models presented so far assume an infinite number
of alternatives from which to choose and an infinite time horizon.
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uttbeg (2002) used simulations to investigate the effects of these
ssumptions on FS, SS and CB models of choice. Simulations showed
hat a reduction in both the number of options and the time for
hoosing had stronger effects on the performance of SS model (with
x threshold) than on that of both the FS and CB models. He con-
luded that, in natural conditions, comparative decision rules could
e as effective as, or even more effective than absolute decision
ules.
.2. The empirical evidence for decision rules
Theoretical studies of mate choice have strongly influenced
he empirical research. Based on the adaptationist assumption
hat selection would provide decision makers with optimal deci-
ion rules, researchers have used simulations to compare the
erformance of different models and to predict which of them
as most likely to occur in natural conditions (Janetos, 1980;
uttbeg, 2002; Real, 1990). As we have shown above, however, the
elative performance of decision models strongly depends on their
ssumptions (Luttbeg, 2002; Luttbeg and Langen, 2004). It seems,
hus, unlikely that the optimality approach on theoretical models
ould provide direct evidence for optimal mate searching tactics
n natural conditions.
Nevertheless, theoretical models could play an invaluable role
n understanding mate choice in natural conditions, for two rea-
ons. First, empiricists deal with patterns and, without models,
t would be impossible to explain them in terms of their under-
ying mechanisms. Second, empiricists want to understand why
uch mechanisms evolved and models could show which factors
re more likely to have favoured or constrained the evolution of
hese mechanisms.
.2.1. Random choice
Many field studies have shown patterns apparently consistent
ith the random choice model. In lekking anurans, females usu-
lly sample males simultaneously from a distance and several field
tudies have shown female preferences for the closest male (Arak,
988; Friedl and Klump, 2005; Grafe, 1997), a pattern which has
een suggested to arise as the effect of “passive attraction” to the
erceived loudest call (Arak, 1988; Parker, 1982; but see Castellano
t al., 2004; Murphy, 2008). Friedl and Klump (2005) observed that
n lekking anurans, the mating success of males depended more on
heir lek attendance than on their courtship performance and con-
luded that female choice was random and played a marginal role
n determining male mating success. According to Friedl and Klump
2005), a female that mates randomly saves the costs of searching
nd, at the same time, is still likely to mate with a high-quality male,
ecause high-quality males could spend more time in advertising
nd thus are more likely to be randomly selected by females.
In general, however, it is hard to see how random female choice
ould have promoted the evolution of a courtship behaviour as
ostly as the calling of chorusing anurans (Castellano, 2009b). What
e perceive as evidence of random female choice (i.e. the lack of
 correlation between mating success and courtship behvaiour of
ales) may  be the effect of a strong female preference for high-
dvertising levels, which forces males either to attain to those
evels or to abandon the competition (Castellano, 2009b; Johnstone,
994). For this reason, we suggest caution from taking random-
hoice patterns as evidence for permissive mating decisions, in
articular, when the costs of mate searching are presumably low
such as in leks).Please cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
.2.2. Fixed sample
Evidence for comparison decision rules (FS model) in mate
hoice comes mainly from lekking species (review in Jennions and
etrie, 1997), in which the costs of searching are generally low and PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx 9
females may  assess several mates simultaneously. In many cho-
rusing treefrogs, for example, females do not move among calling
males, but reach a location, from where they assess several males
simultaneously (Murphy and Gerhardt, 2002). Field experiments
on gray treefrogs have shown that the time required to reach a
decision may  be rather short (about 2 min) (Schwartz et al., 2004).
It is not clear whether this short assessment time is due to cog-
nitive constraints on working memory (Akre and Ryan, 2010) or
whether it represents an optimal tradeoff between the costs and
the benefits of male assessment. A mate-sampling pattern consis-
tent with a FS decision model has been observed also in non-lekking
species of birds (Hovi and Ratti, 1994) and mammals (Byers et al.,
2005; Ferretti et al., 2011). For example, Dale et al. (1992) provided
evidence that female pied flycatchers adopted a comparison deci-
sion rule: females visited several males (three, on average) before
committing, often returned to a previously assessed male, and the
probability of choosing a male did not depend on his position in
the sampling sequence of prospective mates (Dale and Slagsvold,
1996). On average, females spent about 5 h searching for mates, and
in one hour they were able to visit up to seven different prospec-
tive mates. In the Satin bowerbird (Ptilonorchynchus violaceous),
females were found to search for mates for very long periods (15
days, Uy et al., 2000). Before choosing their mate, females visited
several males for courtship and then they returned to a subsample
of them for further evaluation. Females were found to remember
the assessed males not only within, but also between breeding
seasons. Since males of this species use the same bower site in
successive years (Borgia, 1993), there is evidence that females use
previous mating experience in mating decisions: females who, in
the previous year, mated with highly attractive mates, in the suc-
cessive year visited a smaller number of males and were more likely
to re-mate with the same male than were females previously mated
with unattractive males (Uy et al., 2000).
5.2.3. Sequential search
In SS models, females compare males against an internal stan-
dard, which may  be either fixed or variable. The distinction between
the fixed and variable threshold models is ambiguous because, as
we have pointed out above, it is not clear whether experience
affects the decision rule (i.e. the threshold) or the decision vari-
able (as assumed by our Bayesian model) or both. The SS models do
not require females to keep memory of individual males (but only
of their distribution) and thus these tactics are thought to impose
less severe cognitive constraints on female performance than those
imposed by the FS model (and comparative DR).
In practice, both field studies and choice experiments have been
difficult to provide clear evidence for SS decision rules (Jennions
and Petrie, 1997; Valone et al., 1996; Widemo and Saether, 1999).
The SS model assumes no recall of previously sampled males and
thus predicts that choice is for the last of a sequence of sam-
pled prospective mates. However, this rule may result in a pattern
consistent with the FS rule if males, by chance, can be sampled
more than once, and if females accept males that were previously
rejected because of either a variation in flexible thresholds or, sim-
ply, an evaluation error in case of fixed thresholds (Luttbeg, 2002;
Luttbeg and Langen, 2004). Strong evidence for SS decision rule
was reported by Gibson (1996) in the sage grouse, Centrocercus
urophasianus, and by Reid and Stamps (1997) in the pine engraver,
Ips pini. In the latter study, the observed pattern was  consistent
with the SS model with a flexible threshold: females often mated
with the first male encountered, rarely returned to a visited male,
and adjusted their acceptance threshold in relation to the qualityate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
of the patches.
As it concerns the experimental approach, two lines of evi-
dence have been proposed to support the hypothesis of SS decision
rules. First, in two choice discrimination tests, the presence of
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n acceptance threshold is shown if females fail to discriminate
etween two low-quality alternatives. Zuk et al. (1990) showed
hat red jungle fowl females (Gallus gallus),  when given a choice
etween two males with large combs, preferred the one with
he largest attribute, but when both prospective mates had small
ombs, females did not choose or chose randomly. It should be
oticed that, even if an acceptance threshold does exist in this
pecies, it does not prevent females from choosing the best of the
wo alternatives when both were above the acceptance threshold. A
econd line of evidence comes from studies that compare patterns
f mating preferences obtained under different experimental con-
itions. Moore & Moore (1988) studied female mating decision in
 cockroach (Nauphoeta cinerea) and found that mating behaviour
as unaffected by the number of available alternatives: the latency
o approach, to respond to or to mate with a male did not depend
n whether females were tested in two-choice test (between dom-
nant and subordinate males) or in no-choice test (either dominant
r subordinate male). They concluded that female cockroaches did
ot compare alternatives against each other, but against an internal,
xed standard.
Another study supporting the SS model is that by Beckers and
agner (2011) on mate sampling strategies in Gryllus lineaticeps.
emales were tested in three-stimulus choice experiments. They
howed preferences for chirp rates higher than 3 chirps/s over alter-
atives with chirp rates lower than 3 chirps/s, but failed to show
ny preference among calls with chirp rates all higher or all lower
han 3 chirps/s. Interestingly, previous experiments using a two-
hoice testing paradigm provided evidence for much finer levels
f discrimination among chirp rates (Wagner and Basolo, 2007),
hus suggesting that decision rules may  depend on the number of
timuli to which females are simultaneously exposed.
.3. Does variation in the pattern of choice reflect variation in
ecision rules?
Despite the strong theoretical and empirical effort, the ques-
ion of how females choose their mates remains largely unresolved.
ennions and Petrie (1997) suggested that this may  be due to
ariation in mate-decision rules. Variation may  occur at the within-
opulation level. For example, most female pied flycatchers visit
everal males before mating (Dale et al., 1992; Dale and Slagsvold,
996; Hovi and Ratti, 1994), but others mate with the first or with
he last encountered male, showing patterns consistent with both
he FS and the SS models (Fiske and Kalas, 1995). But variation
ay  also occur at the within-individual level. As reported above,
eckers and Wagner (2011) showed that G. lineaticeps females
sed a threshold rule when choosing among three alternatives,
ut switched to a comparative rule when choosing between two
lternatives. MacLaren and Rowland (2006) compared female pref-
rences for male body size in sailfin mollies, Poecilia latipinna. They
bserved a much stronger preference for large size when alterna-
ives were presented in a paired fashion rather than sequentially,
uggesting that females applied comparative decision rules only
hen simultaneous evaluation was possible. Brandt et al. (2005)
howed that lesser wax moth females, Achroia grisella,  used both
bsolute and relative criteria to choose their mates: independent
f the number of available prospective mates, they rejected mates
hat call at a rate lower than a fixed threshold, but, when several
ales called above the acceptance threshold, females chose the one
ith the highest rate.
These empirical studies pose an important theoretical question:Please cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
s variation in the pattern of choice the effect of different decision
ules, or is it the effect of different contexts in which the same
ecision rule is used? We  argue that to respond to this question,
e should adopt a computational approach that aims at explaining PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx
decision rules in terms of their underlying information-processing
mechanisms (Castellano, 2009a).
Castellano and Cermelli (2006) and Phelps et al. (2006) pre-
sented two models to study the relationship between recognition
and discrimination in mating decision. In Castellano and Cermelli’s
(2006) model, the probability of choosing a mate A over an alter-
native B, was assumed to be the sum of the probability that only A
was recognized as an appropriate mate and the combined proba-
bility that both A and B were recognized, but A was preferred to
B. Phelps et al. (2006) used signal detection theory to link per-
ception to decision. In their model, the perceived attractiveness
of a prospective mate was  a stochastic normal variable with vari-
ance proportional to the level of uncertainty (see Eq. (1)). Females
were assumed to choose the most attractive male that exceeded a
minimal recognition threshold (Phelps et al., 2006). In these mod-
els, the mating-decision mechanism depends on both absolute (the
recognition threshold) and comparative DRs and it could be used
independent of females’ mate-sampling tactics.
According to these models, recognition and discrimination are
the expression of the same cognitive machinery, which uses the
same “currency” for making decision (the preference strength in
Phelps et al. (2006), the amount of evidence, A, in our model – see
Eq. (1)). Another possibility, however, is that recognition and dis-
crimination are different processes that evolved to solve different
tasks. In this case, we  should expect a task-specific role of signal
attributes in relation to the type of information they convey. In
recognition tests, signal attributes that convey information impor-
tant for species recognition should affect female mating decision
more strongly than attributes important for mate discrimination.
In discrimination tests, the opposite pattern should be observed.
Phelps et al. (2006) measured female preference strength over a set
of signals in both recognition and discrimination experiments and
found a strong correspondence between the two  preference scales.
Bush et al. (2002) used recognition tests, but measured female pref-
erences as the ratio between the time required to respond to a
certain stimulus and to a standard signal (the latency-ratio test).
They found broad similarities between the preference functions
obtained with the latency-ratio test and the two-choice discrimi-
nation tests. Overall, these studies provide empirical evidence that
recognition and discrimination are the expression of the same cog-
nitive machinery (Castellano, 2009a).
6. Sequential sampling models of mate choice
In Phelps et al.’s model (2006),  the strength of preference
between the two  alternatives depends on the level of uncertainty
(accuracy) of male assessment, but females have no control over
it. As in most of signal detection models, in Phelps et al.’s (2006)
model, uncertainty may  be viewed as the random sampling error
that arises from the integration of independent pieces of evi-
dence over a fixed evaluation time (Castellano, 2009a; Pleskac and
Busemeyer, 2010). In fact, suppose that (i) a female, during a fixed
time interval T, uses n pieces of evidence to assess the attractive-
ness of a mate, (ii) each piece of evidence can be either a positive
(+1 = the male is an appropriate mate) or a null evaluation (0 = no
evidence that the male is an appropriate mate), and (iii) p is the
probability of a positive evaluation. If n is sufficiently large, then
the amount of evidence approximates a normal distribution with
mean np and variance np(1 − p).
Recently, Castellano and Cermelli (2011) presented a
sequential-sampling model of mate choice that can be viewed
as a logical extension of the signal detection model of Phelpsate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
et al. (2006).  Sequential-sampling models of decision making
are a dynamic variant of signal detection models (Pleskac and
Busemeyer, 2010), in that they drop the assumption that decision
makers use a fixed sample size of evidence and assume that
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ecision is made as soon as the accumulating noisy evidence
eaches a fixed threshold (Castellano, 2009a; Castellano and
ermelli, 2011).
Unlike signal detection models, sequential-sampling models
ncorporate time in the decision process and, thus, they could be
sed for investigating speed-accuracy tradeoffs in decision making
Chittka et al., 2009; Sullivan, 1994) and for making testable pre-
ictions on the relationship between choice probability and time
esponse (Kacelnik et al., 2011; Shapiro et al., 2008). Although these
odels have been only recently introduced in behavioural ecology
Castellano and Cermelli, 2011; Kacelnik et al., 2011; Shapiro et al.,
008; Trimmer et al., 2008), they have a long history in cognitive
sychology (review in Ratcliff and Smith, 2004) and in neurobiol-
gy (review in Bogacz, 2007; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Smith and
atcliff, 2004) and they could represent a useful theoretical tool for
uilding bridges between neurobiology and behaviour (Busemeyer
t al., 2006).
Sequential sampling models have been developed to account for
imple two-choice decisions, although they have been also used
or modeling multi-alternative decisions (Roe et al., 2001). Two
ypes of sequential sampling models have been proposed: race (or
ccumulator) and random-walk (or diffusion) models. In race mod-
ls, evidence in favour of one alternative is accumulated in one
esponse counter and evidence in favour of the other alternative
s accumulated on another counter. Decision is made when one of
he two counters reaches a fixed criterion amount of evidence. This
topping rule is defined as ‘absolute’ because counters accumu-
ate evidence over time independently, without interaction. In the
econd type of sequential sampling models (random-walk models
ensu stricto), evidence for either the alternatives accumulate as
 single total, which is the difference in the amount of evidence
etween the alternatives (for this reason, Kacelnik et al. (2011)
roposed for them the picturesque name of ‘tug-of-war’ mod-
ls). Random-walk models assume that evidence accumulates at
iscrete time intervals. When evidence accumulates continuously
ith time, sequential sampling models are named diffusion models
Ratcliff and Smith, 2004).
Castellano and Cermelli’s (2011) model of mate choice is an
xample of accumulator model in that it assumes females to asso-
iate to each prospective mate a “counter”. Although females may
valuate several males simultaneously, assessment is assumed to
e a serial rather than a parallel processing task: females, in fact,
re thought to conduct a repeated sequential scanning of prospec-
ive mates and to acquire information on one male at a time. In this
ay, the model makes the plausible assumption that the rate of
nformation gathering depends more on female intrinsic cognitive
onstraints than on extrinsic ecological factors (such as the number
f males that could be evaluated simultaneously).
Two issues were investigated using this model (Castellano
nd Cermelli, 2011). The first was optimality in mating decision.
ptimal choice was described in terms of the trade-off between
he acceptance threshold and the number of males simultane-
usly assessed. Results of simulations showed that, unless costs
ere very close to zero, the optimal strategy was always assess-
ng several males using a cost-dependent acceptance threshold.
he second issue was the description of female mating prefer-
nces under three experimental choice paradigms: recognition
no-choice), discrimination (two-choice), and time latency tests.
he model showed that recognition and discrimination tests pro-
ided an inaccurate description of mating preferences, because
hey introduced systematic errors that either attenuated (recogni-
ion tests) or exaggerated (discrimination test) the true differencesPlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
n mating preference. In contrast, the latency-ratio test (Bush et al.,
002) performed much better than the recognition and discrim-
nation tests, emphasizing the importance of time responses in
ssessing female mating preferences (Bush et al., 2002; Leonard PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx 11
and Hedrick, 2010; Rebar et al., 2011; Shackleton et al., 2005), as
already shown in other contexts of choice (i.e. food preferences
Bateson and Kacelnik, 1995; Reboreda and Kacelnik, 1991).
The sequential sampling models may  become an appropriate
theoretical framework to understand mate choice from the joint
perspective of the ultimate (functional) and proximate (mechanis-
tic) causes (Castellano, 2009a).  Castellano and Cermelli’s (2011)
model, as well as all the accumulator models, assumes that
evidence for each alternative accumulates separately without
interaction. From this assumption it derives the prediction that,
in two-choice discrimination tests, the more similar the attrac-
tiveness of the two stimuli, the shorter the latency to choose. In
contrast, if the model assumes a direct comparison between the two
alternatives, so that there exists only one decision variable (either
the difference or the ratio between the strength of evidence sup-
porting one over the other alternative), then the (random-walk)
model predicts that the more similar the attractiveness of the two
stimuli the longer the latency to choose. In humans, we usually
find support for the comparative model: response time increases
and accuracy decreases with increasing difficulty of the discrimi-
nation task (Luce, 1986). In contrast, very little is known on how
other animals use information in simultaneous choice.
So far, behavioural ecologists have tackled this question in
a context different from mate choice: prey selection (Kacelnik
et al., 2011; Shapiro et al., 2008; Vasconcelos et al., 2010). Kacel-
nik and colleagues tested the two  sequential sampling models of
making decision (with and without comparison between alterna-
tives) using the European Starling, Sturnus vulgaris, in laboratory
tests on prey selection. By measuring latency to choose, they pro-
vided evidence that starlings, in simultaneous encounters, did not
adopt a comparative evaluation, but processed each alternative
independently. Since, in natural conditions, starlings rarely incur
in two  food items simultaneously, they suggested that natural
selection had not favoured the evolution of cognitive mecha-
nisms to efficiently compare and select the best of the two
alternatives.
As it concerns mate choice, we  may  expect natural selection to
have favoured the evolution of comparative mechanisms of choice
in species where simultaneous encounters of prospective mates
are common, as it is in lekking species. Although no studies have
yet tested this hypothesis, episodic evidence seems to support
it. In Tungara frogs, for example, Phelps et al. (2006) and Bosch
et al. (2000) found a negative correlation between the difficulty
of discrimination and the latency to choose, as predicted by the
comparative sequential sampling models of choice.
6.1. A Bayesian sequential-sampling model of choice
In all sequential-sampling models described so far, the DV is a
scalar quantity and the evaluation process (the integration of evi-
dence over time) is equivalent to the computation of the arithmetic
mean. In our model, however, the DV is the posterior probabil-
ity of a Bayesian computation and integration over time can no
longer be modeled as an additive, linear process. Bayes’ rule yields
an alternative framework to study the process by which males
are evaluated iteratively (Deneve, 2009). Assuming that evaluation
takes place at discrete time steps ti, the resulting accumulation of
evidence can be described by an update of the prior estimate of
the male according to the actual estimate of the male attractive-
ness, i.e., P(H,ti) = P(H|A,ti). By Bayes’ rule, we may  incorporate this
assumption in the recursive relationate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
P(H|A, ti+1) =
u(A)
(u(A) − 1) + 1P(A|H,ti)
(5)
 ING ModelB
1 ural Pr
t
a
P
s
w
c
t
K
t
p
b
i
a
t
a
7
a
r
a
t
d
J
a
f
a
d
p
a
d
m
P
s
P
P
d
c
t
t
a
f
fl
i
b
a
a
e
t
(
m
(
s
f
vARTICLEEPROC-2453; No. of Pages 17
2 S. Castellano et al. / Behavio
Again, it is the utility of the preference value that determines
he outcome of the evaluation process, if u(A) < 1, then P(H|A,ti) → 0
s ti increases: male is almost surely rejected if u(A) > 1, then
(H|A,ti) → 1 as ti increases: male is almost surely accepted, irre-
pective of the initial prior estimate of the male P(H|A,t0) = P(H,t0).
This procedure permits to integrate new pieces of information
ith what is currently known, to reduce uncertainty of the per-
eived world. In control theory, a very similar procedure takes
he name of ‘Kalman’ filtering (Körding, 2007). At each instant, a
alman filter combines acquired information about a system (i.e.
he prior) with a measured observation (the likelihood) to update
redictions of the current state of the system (the posterior proba-
ility). Kalman filters have found several applications, for example,
n aeronautics and in humanoid robotics (see references in Berniker
nd Körding, 2011) and they have been used also in neuroscience,
o develop neuro-physiological models of motor controls (Berniker
nd Körding, 2011).
. Multiple cues, multi-dimension preference functions,
nd multiple decision variables
So far, we have assumed that females use a one-dimension
epresentation of male attractiveness. However, when females
ssess several cues and signals across multiple sensory modalities,
he internal representation of male attractiveness may  be multi-
imensional, involving multiple preference functions (Fawcett and
ohnstone, 2003b; Hohenlohe and Arnold, 2010). In these cases (see
lso Section 3), there may  be a single DV that integrates information
rom multiple preference functions or there may  be as many DVs
s the number of preference functions. In the latter case, mating
ecisions depend on the priority that females assign to each DV.
The first case is an example of Bayesian integration of multi-
le sensory cues, in which the DV is the conditional probability of
 male to be perceived as an appropriate mate, given his multi-
imension attractiveness. In a two dimension representation of
ate attractiveness, for example, Eq. (2) becomes:
(H|A1, A2) =
P(A1, A2|H)
P(A1, A2)
P(H) (6)
If A1 and A2 involve traits from different sensory modalities
o that their noise sources are statistically independent (Knill and
ouget, 2004), then Eq. (5) can be rewritten as:
(H|A1, A2) =
P(A1|H)P(A2|H)
P(A1)P(A2)
P(H) (7)
Eq. (6) predicts that when the relative uncertainty of each cue
iffers, the integrated estimate is biased toward the more reliable
ue (Knill and Pouget, 2004), in other words, it predicts females
o weigh cues in relation to their level of uncertainty. This predic-
ion is consistent with the observation that female mating decisions
re often flexible and biased to the cues with the largest dif-
erences between prospective mates. For example, female pied
ycatchers, when given a choice between two males that differed
n plumage colour and quality of the defended nest, choose on the
asis of the cue that differed more heavily between males (Dale
nd Slagsvold, 1996). In the three-spined stickleback Gasterosteus
culeatus, females change their mating decision in relation to the
nvironmental conditions: in clear water, they rely more on visual
han olfactory cues, but the pattern is reversed in turbid water
Heuschele et al., 2009). Similar patterns of flexible preferences for
ulti-component signals were also observed by Calkins and Burley
2003) in the Californian Quail, Callipepla californica,  and in the wolfPlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
pider Schizocosa ocreata (Scheffer et al., 1996).
A second possibility for processing multi-dimension preference
unctions is to associate to each preference function a decision
ariable and to order decision variables in terms of importance. PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx
In human decision making this decision process is named “take-
the-best rule” and is an example of “fast” and “frugal” heuristics
(see Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 2005). Prospective mates are com-
pared with respect to the most important attribute. If one of them
is preferred over the alternatives then that male is chosen regard-
less of the perceived values of the other attributes. If no male
is preferred, then the second attribute in order of importance is
considered, then the third, and so on. Empirical evidence for hier-
archical assessment of multi-attribute signals is scarce. Scheuber
et al. (2004) studied female preferences for multi-attribute acous-
tic signals in the field cricket, Gryllus campestris.  In univariate two
choice tests, female crickets preferred higher-than-average chirp
rates and lower-than-average chirp frequencies, but when females
were given a choice between a call with low frequency and low
chirp rate and an alternative with high frequency and high chirp
rate the preference for the low-frequency call was apparently unaf-
fected by the low chirp rate, suggesting a hierarchical evaluation of
the two acoustic properties. A similar pattern of preferences was
also observed in guppies: females were found to prefer males with
large rather than small orange areas and with bright rather than
dull coloration, but when the two attributes were negatively corre-
lated, female choice depended on the size of the orange spots, but
not on the intensity of their coloration (Karino et al., 2010).
Hierarchical assessment of multiple cues has been proposed as
a simple but effective decisional mechanism that does not require
large amount of information and allows fast and effective deci-
sions, even under strong cognitive limitations (Gigerenzer and
Todd, 1999). As observed for animals, the empirical evidence that
humans use this heuristics are however scant (Newell, 2005) and
alternative and more parsimonious decision-making models have
been suggested. In particular, Lee and Cummins (2004) presented
a Bayesian sequential-sampling model of choice, in which decision
makers were assumed to accumulate evidence in favour of either
one of the two alternatives by sequentially sampling their attributes
until an acceptance threshold was  reached. For low thresholds, the
model predicted patterns of choice similar to those obtained from
hierarchical-assessment models (Lee and Cummins, 2004). Accord-
ing to these authors, the “take-the-best” heuristics (i.e. hierarchical
assessment) is not an alternative mechanism, but a special case of
a more general model of decision making (Newell, 2005).
8. Comparative mate choice and rationality in decision
making
If females order males along a one-dimension preference func-
tion and choose the male with the highest preference score, then
mate choice is expected to obey to three principles of economic
rationality: transitivity, regularity and independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) (Kacelnik, 2006; Houston et al., 2007a,b; Roe et al.,
2001).
Transitivity is a condition related to the pattern of dichotomous
preferences over a set of three or more alternatives. It requires that,
given three options A, B, and C, if a female prefers A over B and B over
C, then she must prefer also A over C. The conditions of regularity
and the IIA require that the relative preference for A over B does not
change when a third alternative is added to the choice set, because
this new option is expected to take from the others proportionally
to their original shares (Heath and Chatterjee, 1995). In marketing
research, however, both the regularity and the IIA conditions are
known to be consistently violated when an asymmetrically decoy is
added to the set of two  or more items. In Fig. 4, we show two exam-ate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
ples of violation, known as the “similarity effect” and the “attraction
effect”. The “similarity effect” is observed when an asymmetrically
competitive decoy (C) is added to a set of dissimilar and equally pre-
ferred items (A and B). The C item is an asymmetrically competitive
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelBEPROC-2453; No. of Pages 17
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Fig. 4. Attraction and similarity effects in human decisions. Suppose you have to choose between two alternatives (A and B) that differ in two attributes (cue 1 and 2). A is
better  than B with respect to cue 2 and B is better than A with respect to cue 1. In a two choice test you do not show any preference for either the alternatives. Now, suppose
a  third alternative (either C or D) is added to A and B. This alternative is asymmetric (because it is more similar to A than to B) and, in one case (competitive decoy – C), it is
dominated neither by A nor by B, whereas in the second case (dominated decoy – D) it is dominated by the most similar alternative (i.e. A). If you decided rationally, your
preference for A over B should not change. But, often, this is not what you will do. The similarity effect predicts that, when the competitive decoy C is added to A and B, you
will  be more likely to prefer B than A, because C takes more shares from the similar A than from the dissimilar B. The attraction effect predicts the opposite pattern, when the
d eing 
w
o
i
d
m
1
n
i
a
t
U
B
D
i
r
d
a
h
w
i
t
a
K
u
w
v
e
t
d
d
c
f
a
d
pominated decoy D is added to the set of A and B, you will probably perceive A as b
hereas B dominates D in only one of the two  attributes.
ption because it is not dominated by either A or B, and because it
s much more similar to A than to B. As a consequence of the intro-
uction of C, the probability of choosing the similar A decreases
uch more than that of choosing the dissimilar B (Huber et al.,
982). The similarity effect explains why a company that is plan-
ing to launch a new product on the market tries to differentiate
t from those already present to minimize “cannibalization” (Heath
nd Chatterjee, 1995). The “attraction effect” is observed when the
hird option is an asymmetrically dominated decoy as it is D in Fig. 4.
nlike C, in fact, D is inferior to and is dominated by A (but not by
) in both the attributes. The “attraction effect” predicts that when
 is added to the control choice set, the probability of choosing A
ncreases and that of choosing B decreases, thus violating both the
egularity and the IIA conditions (Huber et al., 1982).
Since irrational choice has been observed in human economic
ecisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and in experiments of
nimal foraging (Bateson et al., 2003; Shafir, 1994), researchers
ave recently asked if females show irrational mating decisions as
ell (Bateson and Healy, 2005, Kirkpatrick et al., 2006). Observ-
ng departure from rational mate choice may  be important for
wo reasons. First, irrational mate choice may  have unpredictable
nd important evolutionary effects (Bateson and Healy, 2005;
irkpatrick et al., 2006). Second, it may  provide insights into the
nderlying mechanisms of mating decisions, in much the same
ay as visual illusions can help to understand the rules that govern
isual perception (Newell, 2005).
To test violation of the regularity and the IIA conditions, Royle
t al. (2008) devised a three-choice experiment on female sword-
ails, Xiphophorus helleri,  to analyse the effect of asymmetrically
ominated decoys on two male characters, subjected to strong
irectional female preferences: body size and sword size. In two-
hoice tests, females did not show significant overall preferencePlease cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
or either large-body or long-sword males. When a third male (the
symmetrically-dominated decoy) was added to the set, females
id change their preferences, but in a direction opposite to that
redicted by the “attraction effect”. In fact, the introduction of amore attractive than B, because A dominates D with respect to both the attributes,
body-size decoy increased the preference for the long-sword male,
whereas the introduction of a sword decoy increased the prefer-
ence for the large-size male. These results suggested that the third
alternative acted as a competitive rather than dominated option,
because the pattern observed was consistent with the “similarity”
rather than with the “attraction effect”. Royle et al. (2008) explained
their results as the effect of the preference for the rare-phenotype
(Eakley and Houde, 2004; Kokko et al., 2007), a pattern that has
been observed also in other choice contexts (Waite, 2008).
At the moment, we do not know how common is irrational mate
choice (Ryan et al., 2009). Fuller and Johnson (2009) found no sup-
port for a rare male mating advantage in bluefin killifish, Lucania
goodei.  Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) rejected the hypothesis that female
Túngara frogs used strict mating preferences, but found no evidence
for intransitive mate choice. Reaney (2009) found no clear evi-
dence for an attraction effect in female fiddler crabs, Uca mjobergi.
But suppose we found that females sometime chose irrationally,
what would be the implications of this finding on mating decision
models?
Departure from the principles of economic rationality is often
assumed as evidence for comparative evaluation of multiple
attribute options (Bateson and Healy, 2005). But our sequential-
sampling models show that there are two  different ways in which
comparison can be carried out. In race models, comparison is indi-
rect, because evidence for each option accumulates on different
DVs, without interaction. In random-walk (tug-of-war) models,
comparison is direct, because DVs are determined by the between-
option interaction. Both the race and diffusion models as well as
the Bayesian sequential model, however, predict rational choice
and cannot explain either the attraction or the similarity effects.
Irrational choice, thus, is not coherent with our (as well as most
of) models of choice. To explain these phenomena within the theo-ate choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behav. Process. (2012),
retical framework of sequential sampling models, Roe et al. (2001)
introduce the concept of lateral inhibition between multi-attribute
alternatives. In this model, the options are assumed to inhibit each
other proportionally to their perceived similarity. In much the same
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ay as lateral inhibition in perception enhances visual edges, the
odel assumes that “similarity” inhibition between alternatives
einforces the perceived difference between otherwise very simi-
ar options. According to this hypothesis, departures from rational
hoice are not the effect of cognitive constraints, but rather the side-
ffects of mechanisms that evolved to improve accuracy in decision
aking (Castellano, 2009a).
. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a thesis, derived a hypothesis,
nd tested it. Our thesis is that mate choice is the outcome of infor-
ation processing mechanisms that can be formally explained by
hat Marr (1982) called a “computational theory”. Our hypothesis
s that the computational theory of mate choice is a Bayesian inte-
ration of evidence over time. In a certain way, our review is a first
ttempt of testing this hypothesis.
Our approach is similar to what cognitive psychologists know
s the “rational” analysis of behaviour and cognition (Chater et al.,
003), because it assumes that, if the cognitive machinery has
volved to achieve a goal in a certain environment, then it can be
escribed as approximating the optimal solution to achieve that
oal in that environment (Chater et al., 2003). In behavioural ecol-
gy a similar approach has been adopted by students of foraging
ehaviour and it resulted in the formulation of the optimal foraging
heory (Stephens and Krebs, 1986). In sexual selection and in mate
hoice, an alternative approach has prevailed. It emphasises the role
f ecological constraints and focuses on the “algorithms” (the rules)
ather than on the “computational theory” of mating decisions.
n much the same way as, in cognitive psychology, the ‘fast-and-
rugal’ heuristics try to explain human judgment (Gigerenzer and
oldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999), in behavioural ecol-
gy, the normative models of mate choice (i.e. best-of-n, sequential
earch rules) try to explain female mate choice as a set of adaptive
ools that evolved under different selective pressures and cogni-
ive constraints. Our central argument is that these heuristics can
e ascribed to a unique decisional mechanism, that we hypothesize
o be the Bayesian integrator.
We  highlight three main reasons why our computational model
f mate choice may  deserve considerations by both the theoretical
nd empirical research in mate choice. First, it has solid biological
ases. According to ‘Bayesian coding hypothesis’ (Knill and Pouget,
004), neurons code information about sensory uncertainty in the
orm of probability distributions, suggesting that computations
nderlying perception and decision making may  be appropriately
escribed by Bayesian processes. Recent studies in neuroeconomics
Glimcher, 2005) provide evidence that decisions in simple choice
asks can be predicted by the differential firing rates of neurons
oding for different actions (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004), a dynamic
hat can be properly described by the sequential sampling models
e present here and which have been used by mathematical psy-
hologists to explain human decisions (Bogacz, 2007; Churchland
t al., 2008; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff, 2001).
Second, it is a comprehensive model because it can explain sev-
ral aspects of mate choice, such as the use of private and public
nformation, the role of choosiness and plasticity, the accuracy-
peed tradeoffs in mating decisions, aspects that have been rarely
onsidered within a unitary theoretical framework. Third, it allows
o make predictions both on the proximate mechanisms and ulti-
ate causes of mate choice. For example, the model may  be used
o predict the effects of the number of alternatives on mating pref-Please cite this article in press as: Castellano, S., et al., Computational m
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2012.02.010
rences (in terms of both strength and response time), it may  be
sed to test the hypothesis of rational mate choice and to under-
tand the mechanisms responsible for irrational choice. The model
an be used to analyse costs, benefits and optimality of mating PRESS
ocesses xxx (2012) xxx– xxx
decisions and departures from optimal mating decisions may  pro-
vide insights into the evolutionary role of ecological and cognitive
constraints. In conclusion, we think this model may  be useful to stu-
dents that try to integrate mechanisms and functions in the study
of mate choice (McNamara and Houston, 2009).
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